Institutional Investors, the Equity Market and Forced Indebtedness by Toporowski, Jan
 1 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, THE EQUITY MARKET AND FORCED 
INDEBTEDNESS 
 
 
Jan Toporowski 
Economics Department 
The School of Oriental and African Studies 
University of London 
 
 
Published in in S. Dullien, E. Hein, A. Truger and T. van Treeck The World Economy in 
Crisis – The Return of Keynesianism Marburg, Germany: Metropolis Verlag 2010 pp. 
119-129 ISBN 978-3-89518-806-0. 
 
This paper revisits some of the issues originally put forward by the author as the theory of 
capital market inflation, in the book The End of Finance (Toporowski 2000). The paper 
makes much clearer the key assumptions and relationships between the operations of the 
capital dominated by institutional investors, and the balance sheets of companies. In this 
way, it presents a theory of how macroeconomic dynamics may be affected by 
disequilibrium in the capital market. 
 
The first part of the paper examines the demand for new equity issues by institutional 
investors, namely insurance companies and pension funds. In the second part of the paper 
it is argued that the tendency of pension funds to mature may be a factor in forcing 
companies into debt and thus discouraging their investment and restricting their cash 
flow. The tendency towards forced indebtedness may be reinforced by an inelastic 
demand for capital by banks. The third part of the paper argues that the inelastic supply 
of capital in the capital market gives rise to processes of capital market inflation or 
deflation. The first of these may make banks more fragile. The second may contribute to 
deflationary processes in the macroeconomy. A fourth section argues that further 
instability is added by international capital market integration.  
 
 
1. The demand for new equity 
This section examines key features of the demand for new equity by institutional 
investors, i.e., the purchase of securities in the primary market for equity capital, over and 
above new issues replacing other issues, by pension funds and insurance companies. It is 
understood that these institutions buy the vast bulk of new equity (common stock) issues, 
so that individual and bank stock purchases are negligible. The demand for such 
securities depends on the cash flow of pension funds and insurance companies and 
regulations that require them to hold more secure bonds, in particular government bonds, 
against the pension or insurance liabilities of such institutions as the due dates for paying 
out such liabilities approaches. 
 
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that the dividend policy of companies has a 
substitution effect, but no portfolio effect; i.e., a company paying a higher dividend may 
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create a higher demand for its stock, but this will be at the expense of demand for the 
stocks of other companies. Dividend policy therefore cannot affect the proportion of 
institutional cash flow allocated to buying equity, so that higher dividends will not cause 
institutions to substitute stocks for bonds or bank deposits in their portfolios. The buying 
of new equity issues by pension and insurance companies therefore depends on two 
factors. The first is the gross cash inflow of insurance companies and pension funds. This 
consists of two elements. The first of these are the contributions of workers to pension 
schemes, and the premiums that they pay for insurance. The second are the returns of 
pension funds and insurance companies from their investments. As a first approximation, 
these two elements may be taken to be more or less proportional to employment income. 
Out of this, and given no cash outflows on pensions and insurance claims, a certain 
fraction of that gross cash inflow will be allocated to the purchase of new equity issues.  
 
The amount of the gross cash inflow that may thus be allocated to buying new shares may 
be written as c.Lt. Lt represents employment income. c is some fraction of it, representing 
the contribution rate (i.e., the proportion of employment income that is paid into pension 
and insurance funds) and the proportion of that contribution that fund managers wish and 
are allowed by regulation to invest in equity stocks. As a second approximation it may be 
assumed that returns on investments that grow more rapidly or more slowly than the 
growth of employment income are off-set by changes in the contribution rate. In other 
words, if returns from investment rise more rapidly than employment income, the 
contribution rate to pension funds and insurance companies will be reduced to off-set 
this. If investment income rises more slowly, pension funds and insurance companies will 
raise contributions and premiums. Finally, it is assumed that, given no change in their 
outgoings, fund managers’ preference for equity is constant. 
 
The second factor that determines institutional demand for equity is the requirement that 
pension and insurance funds pay out on their insurance and pension liabilities. Such funds 
usually reduce their equity holdings in advance of payments of such liabilities, either 
because they are obliged by regulations to reduce their holdings, in favour of cash (bank 
deposits) or bonds as the due dates for such payments approaches, or because their 
managers wish to avoid the risk of being obliged to sell equity at an unfavourable price 
when the payments are due. In the case of insurance payments these have some variance, 
with large pay-outs at times of major disasters. But we may assume that insurance 
companies hold precautionary balances of bonds and short-term securities to defray their 
outgoings in respect of such disasters. The effect of more regular insurance payments on 
the demand for company shares may therefore be represented as a constant fraction of 
employment income, i.Lt .  
 
Insurance payments may therefore be combined with the gross cash flow of institutional 
investors so that c.Lt – i.Lt =  c’.Lt . 
 
Pension funds, however, do not have such stable outgoings. In general, at start-up, 
pension funds have few liabilities, and, because they depend on the length of a 
pensioner’s contribution history, they rise faster than contributions. For example, in its 
first year the pensioners of a fund will have very small pensions from that fund because 
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they will only have been contributing to it on average for six months. In the second year, 
however, the number of pensioners may be expected to double but the average 
contribution history will also double to one year, so that there will not only now be more 
pensioners, but also higher pensions to be paid out. In this way, pension funds approach 
maturity, i.e., the point where all their contributions must immediately be paid out in 
pensions. Beyond maturity a pension fund has to start selling its assets. (The argument 
here does not do full justice to the complexities of Defined Benefit or Defined 
Contribution pension schemes but as an approximation is adequate for the analysis 
presented here. See Toporowski 2000, part 2.) 
 
This pension fund maturing effect on equity demand may be represented by the term P.t
ά
 
where t represents the time period from now, when t = 1; P is a negative coefficient 
representing pensions liabilities requiring the pension fund to switch into bond or cash 
(bank deposit) assets; and ά is a coefficient greater than 1. ά therefore represents the rate 
at which pension funds mature. But it also depends on the value of insurance portfolios 
relative to pension funds. Thus in an institutional setting where insurance companies 
prevail, and pension funds are negligible, (perhaps because of state provision of pensions)  
the value of ά will tend to 1 and the term P.tά will tend to be constant. Where insurance 
companies are negligible and pension funds absorb long-term saving, ά will be 
considerably larger than 1, and the (negative) value of P.t
ά
 will rise exponentially. 
 
In a given period, t, the purchase of new equity, Et in a market dominated by pension 
funds and insurance companies may be represented by the expression: 
 
  Et = c’.Lt - P.t
ά
     (1) 
 
 
The issue of new equity capital is undertaken by banks and non-financial companies. 
Insurance companies do issue capital but their capital issues do not substantially alter the 
argument in this paper. For the sake of simplicity new capital issues for insurance 
companies may be assumed to be zero. 
 
 
2. The forced indebtedness of companies 
This section examines how the inelastic demand for (net) new equity issues may force 
companies into debt. For the sake of exposition, it is useful to consider first a ‘Keynesian’ 
steady state, i.e., a capitalist economy in which employment and employment income (Lt) 
are constant because gross expenditure on fixed capital investment is constant (Kalecki 
1936). In this situation, because gross expenditure on fixed investment is the same over a 
succession of periods, net new capital issues by non-financial companies, either to pre-
finance investments that are being externally financed, or to replenish reserves drawn 
down by internal financing of investment, will also be the same in each of those periods.  
 
The remaining new capital stocks will be issued by banks (or banks and insurance 
companies). In each successive period, the banking system makes additional new loans 
and therefore requires, in accordance with bank capital regulations, additional new 
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capital. Initially, to simplify the argument, this additional new capital may be assumed to 
be constant over the succession of periods under consideration. 
 
It is also convenient to start with a situation of equilibrium in the market for new equity 
issues so that, at least in the first period, t = 1, new capital issues by banks, Cb , plus new 
capital issues by non-financial companies, Cc are equal to the demand for new capital 
issues, c’.Lt - P.t
ά
 : 
 
  Cb + Cc = c’.Lt - P.t
ά
    (2) 
 
In the first period, t = 1, so that the second term on the right hand side of this equation 
reduces, in that period, to P
ά
 . 
 
In the second period, if ά > 1 , because of the maturing of pension funds, the term P.tά  
will now be greater, and the negative coefficient will mean that the desired sales of 
additional equities, Cb + Cc will be greater than the demand for such new issues from 
pension funds and insurance companies. 
 
How is such a disequilibrium between supply and demand in the capital market resolved 
in the real world? Two considerations are crucial. One is that banks are obliged to hold a 
certain amount of capital in proportion to the size of their balance sheets and the riskiness 
of that balance sheet. By contrast, the amount of capital that non-financial companies are 
obliged to hold is minimal. Companies can therefore replace capital which they cannot 
raise by debt (bank borrowing, or the issue of debt instruments, company paper or 
bonds). Banks cannot do so and will therefore pay whatever price is necessary in the 
market to make their new capital issues. 
 
Starting from a position of capital market equilibrium in period t = 1, the borrowing that 
companies are forced to undertake by their inability to raise capital is represented by  
 
 P.t
ά
  -  P
ά
   or  P(t – 1)ά           (3) 
 
That is, in the first period of capital market equilibrium, this will be zero. After this, the 
‘forced indebtedness’ of the companies will rise exponentially in each period by exactly 
the same amount by which pension funds are reducing their buying of new equity. This 
‘forced indebtedness’ will not, however, be equally distributed among companies. In the 
real world, the largest companies usually have better connections with the investment 
banking community that organises new capital issues for them. The largest companies 
may therefore remain unaffected by the reduction in demand for new equity. It is the next 
tier of companies, currently financed by debt or inadequate venture capital, that will find 
their capital market debut frustrated by the fall in demand for new capital issues. 
 
This is illustrated in the following diagram: 
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The curved line at the top of the diagram represents the supply of equity capital, 
decreasing exponentially from the point Cc + Cb, where this supply equals demand. The 
‘forced’ indebtedness of companies is represented by the line P(t – 1)ά. This starts at zero 
and rises parallel with line c’.Lt - P.t
ά
  .   
 
The response of companies to forced indebtedness is to postpone planned investment 
(Steindl 1952, pp. 119-120). A decline in capital spending by companies reduces the cash 
flow of the corporate sector. This in turn will lead an inability on the part of some 
companies to service their debts. Capital adequacy requirements would then require 
banks to issue more capital to set against the deterioration of banks’ loan books caused by 
companies’ difficulties in servicing their debts. The rise in bank capital issues, in its turn, 
will reduce even further the amount of new capital available for companies.  
 
 
3. Capital market inflation and deflation 
In the previous section it was assumed that the capital market starts off from a position of 
equilibrium, in which all banks, financial institutions and companies are able to find 
purchasers for their new capital.  
 
In practice, the capital market is rarely is such a condition of equilibrium: that supply 
equals demand at all times in the market does not mean that all potential capital issuers 
may issue stocks at prices determined by the prospective yields of those stocks. Many, 
especially smaller and medium-sized firms, are unable to issue capital stocks at any price 
at all. From the point of view of understanding the dynamics of the major capital markets 
in the main financial centres of the world and the way in which those markets interact 
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with the banking system and the real economy, it is much more illuminating to consider 
two situations of initial disequilibrium in the markets. 
 
The common assumption in finance theory and macroeconomics is that the price of 
capital brings into equilibrium the demand and supply of capital (for example, the general 
equilibrium case of Tobin’s ‘q’). However, the demand and supply of equity capital will 
only be brought into equilibrium if the price of capital (the dividend payable on that 
capital) truly constitutes the opportunity cost of a given productive capital investment 
project, so that returns from such investment that are below that price will not be 
undertaken. Capital market inflation or deflation in fact adds to that price the ‘externality’ 
of a capital gain or loss, paid by financial investors in the market, rather than by the 
owners of productive capital assets financed by equity capital traded in the capital 
market. In this way the price of equity capital ceases to operate as the opportunity cost of 
any given investment project. That opportunity cost becomes the dividend yield that a 
given firm would have to offer, plus the prospective capital gain or loss that a stock might 
obtain in an inflating or deflating capital market. Low dividend yields will not encourage 
productive investment, if those low yields are brought about by a process of capital 
market inflation that raises prospective capital gains on financial investment in equities. 
Such a situation would merely encourage non-financial firms to devote their liquid 
reserves to financial investments in equity capital, through merger and takeover activity, 
rather than productive investments. High dividend yields from a process of capital market 
deflation will be off-set by prospective capital losses, and will thereby fail to elicit 
increased an increased demand for or supply of equity capital issues. In this way, capital 
market inflation and deflation reinforce the inelasticity of demand and supply in the 
equity capital market (cf. Toporowski 2008). 
 
Where the demand and supply of equity capital are not equal, and the price system, as 
argued above, does not bring them into equilibrium, the capital market enters a process of 
inflation or inflation, according to whether there is excess demand or excess supply in the 
market. In a period of inflation, prices of financial assets rise and the resultant capital 
gains attract speculative funds. The entry of speculative funds increases the demand for 
equity capital issues. On the supply side, companies which had satisfied their requirement 
for equity capital find that they can issue additional equity cheaply; financing costs can 
be reduced by issuing equity to repay debt, and even if debt is not repaid, excess capital 
can be held as liquid assets thereby increasing the liquidity of (over-capitalised) company 
balance sheets and hence the stability of those balance sheets (Toporowski 2008).  
 
Such over-capitalisation tends to be concentrated among larger corporations that have 
ready access to the equity capital market, rather than being spread more equally, to match 
capital need, among small and medium-sized enterprises. A corollary of over-
capitalisation is therefore the exit of large corporations from the activity of borrowing 
directly from banks. This does not mean that banks may not hold the liabilities of those 
large corporations. But if they do so, it is as company paper bought in inflated markets at 
prices that hardly give banks much margin over banks’ cost of funds. 
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The decline of bank lending to large companies has serious implications for the stability 
of bank balance sheets. Along with governments, which also shift towards issuing long-
term securities when capital markets are inflating, large companies are the most reliable 
borrowers from banks. Banks therefore find their lending restricted to much less stable 
borrowers among other financial intermediaries (hedge funds, equity funds, derivatives 
traders), households and small and medium-sized enterprises. The combination of 
company over-capitalisation and selective bank disintermediation lies behind key features 
of the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s in the U.S. and U.K.: corporations using 
excess capital to finance merger and takeover activity, while banks moved from one 
financial crisis to the next. The relative position of these two sectors was apparent in their 
respective credit ratings, with the largest corporations holding better credit ratings than 
many banks. 
 
The situation is reversed where equity capital supply is less than demand for such 
securities. The deflation of the capital market means that companies which would have 
preferred equity finance now have to finance themselves with debt. As indicated above, 
at the end of section 3, forced indebtedness discourages investment, which in turn 
restricts the cash flow of the corporate sector. The additional debt, with restricted cash 
flow, reduces the quality of bank assets held in the form of lending to companies. If 
banks are obliged to raise additional capital in line with the deterioration of their loan 
books, this squeezes the amount of capital available for companies and forces them 
further into unwanted debt. In this way, the deflation of the capital market may initiate 
and reinforce deflationary processes in the economy at large. 
 
 
4. Open Economy Considerations 
The discussion in the previous sections identify key features of a closed economy 
dominated by capital markets in which the key investors are institutions such as insurance 
companies and pension funds holding portfolios of long term securities. International 
capital market integration in theory, and in a situation of fixed exchange rates, is 
supposed to make capital supply more elastic with respect to capital demand. In a 
situation of perfect integration, with fixed exchange rates, and without the dominance of 
long-term investing institutions, capital supply may become more elastic. But with trade 
in the largest capital markets being determined by those long-term investing institutions, 
it is likely that this would reproduce on a global scale the capital market disequilibrium 
described above, unless in that global capital market pension fund maturities could be 
staggered to stabilise their equity demand. In practice, however, there are three further 
complications added where economies have open capital accounts allowing international 
portfolio diversification. 
 
First of all, incomplete integration makes international capital flows less stable, with a 
tendency for capital flows into particular markets to reverse themselves more rapidly. 
This would then result in greater volatility of c’ (the net demand for equity capital issues) 
in emerging markets without large investing institutions capable of accommodating in 
their portfolios the more volatile foreign capital flows. Secondly, the demand for equity 
capital issues would now be augmented by sovereign wealth funds. Because of their 
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deferred liabilities, these institutions may have a more stable demand for equity capital. 
But their more stable demand would be off-set by the demand of very wealthy individuals 
whose portfolio preferences are likely to be much less stable.  
 
Finally, in a global capital market, the burden of forced indebtedness on medium-sized 
companies in the advanced capitalist countries would also be borne by many businesses 
in developing countries and emerging markets. But the greater volatility of capital 
markets in emerging markets would further discourage the holding of locally-issued 
equity capital. In this way, forced indebtedness would bear down most heavily on 
businesses in developing countries. Capital market disequilibrium would thus become a 
constraint on the expansion of business in the developing countries. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The supply of equity capital from long-term investing institutions, such as pension funds 
and insurance companies in practice makes the equity capital market less adaptable to 
demand for equity capital from companies. The effect of this is to force companies into 
debt, with adverse consequences for their willingness to invest and their cash flow. In this 
way, capital market disequilibrium may initiate and reinforce deflationary tendencies in 
the economy at large, and destabilise bank balance sheets in particular. 
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